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CHARLES TAYLOR is a professor of Philosophy at McGill
University in Montreal. He has also taught at other universities in
the United States, Germany and France, as well as holding the
Chichele Chair for Social and Political Theory at Oxford from
1976-1981.
He is one of the leading theorists of the intellectual movement
known as communitarianism and is considered to be among the
key thinkers laying the foundation for communitarian thought.
Much of his recent work stakes out what he calls "middle ground"
or an "alternative position" between the extremes in today's
political and cultural controversies.
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Quebec and Canadian politics. He was a candidate for the Federal
Parliament on behalf of the New Democratic Party on a number
of occasions during the 1960s, and also served on the executive
committee of the Party until 1976. He has been actively engaged
on the federalist side in the two referenda on Quebec independence, in 1980 and 1995.
An undergraduate of McGill University, Professor Taylor received his M.A. and D. Phil. from Oxford. He returned to McGill
in 1961 to teach philosophy and political science. He is married to
Alba Romer, an artist, and has five children.
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Charles Taylor, january 25, 1996.
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A CATHOUC MODERNITY?

I

want to say first how deeply honoured I am to have been
chosen as t,his year's recipient of the Marianist Award. I am very
grateful to the University of Dayton, not only for their recognition
of my work, but also for this chance to raise today with you some
issues which have been at the centre of my concern for decades.
They ~ave been reflected in my philosophical work, but not in the
same form as I raise them this afternoon, because of the nature of
philosophical discourse (as I see it, anyway), which has to try to
persuade honest thinkers of any and all metaphysical or theological commitments. I am very glad of the chance to open out with
you some of the questions which sun:pund the notion of a catholic
modernity.
I

My title could have been reversed; I could have called this talk:
"a modern catholicism?" But such is the force of this adjective
'modern' in our culture, that one might immediately get the sense
that the object of iny search was a new, better, higher catholicism,
meant to replace all those outmoded varieties which clutter up our
past. But to search for this would be to chase a chimaera, a monster
that cannot exist in the nature of things.
Cannot exist because of what 'catholicism' means, at least to
me. So I'll start saying a word about that. "Go ye and teach all
nations." How to understand this injunction? The easy way, the
one in which it has all too often been taken, has been to take the
global world view, of us who are Christians, and strive to make over
other nations and cultures to fit it. But this violates one of the basic
demands of Catholicism. I want to take the original word 'katholou'
in two related senses, comprising both universality and wholeness; one might say: universality through wholeness.
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Redemption happens through Incarnation, the weaving of
God's life into human lives. But these human lives are different,
plural, irreducible to each other. Redemption-Incarnation brings
reconciliation, a kind of oneness. But this is the oneness of diverse
beings who come to see that they cannot attain wholeness alone,
that their complementarity is esse~tial, rather than of beings who
come to accept that they are ultimately identiCal. Or perhaps we
might put it: complementarity and identity will both be part of our
ultimate oneness. Our great historical temptation has been to_
forget the complementarity, to go straight for the sameness,
making as many people as possible into "good c~tholics" - and
in the process failing of catholicity.
Failing of catholicity, because failing wholeness: unity bought
at the price of suppressing something of the diversity in the
humanity that God created; unity of the part masquerading as the
whole. Universality without wholeness, and so not true catholicism.
This unity-across-difference, as against unity-through-identity,
seems the only one possible for us, not only because of the
diversity among humans, starting with the difference between
men and women, and ramifying outward. It's not just that the
human material, with which God's life is 'to be interwoven,
imposes this formula, as a kind of second-best solution to
sameness. Nor is it just because any unity between humans and
God would have to be one across (immense) difference. But it
seems that the life of God itself, understood as trinitarian, is already
a oneness of this kir:td. Human diversity is part of the way in which
we are made in the image of God.
So a Catholic principle, if I can put it in this perhaps over-rigid
way, is: no widening of the faith without an increase in the variety
of devotions and spiritualities and liturgical forms and responses
to Incarnation. This is a demand which we in the Catholic Church
have often failed to respect, but which we have also often tried to
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live up to- I'm thinking, for instance, of the great Jesuit missions
in China and India at the beginning of the modern era.
The advantage of us moderns is that, living in the wake of so
many varied forms of Christian life, we have this vast field of
spiritualities already there before us with which to compensate for
our own narrowness, to remind us of all that we need to
complement our own partiality,·on our road-to wholeness. Which
is why I'm chary of the possible resonance of "a modern
catholicism," with the potential echoes of triumphalism and selfsufficiency residing in the adjective (added to those which have
often enough resided in the noun!)
The point is not to be a "modern catholic," if by this we
(perhaps semi-consciously and surreptitiously) begin to see ourselves as the ultimate "compleat catholics," summing up and going
beyond our less advantaged ancestors 1 (a powerful connotation
which hangs over the word 'modern' in much contemporary use).
The point rather is, taking our modern civilization for another of
those great cultural forms which have come and gone in human
history, to see what it means to be a Christian here, to find our
authentic voice in the eventual catholic chorus; to try to do for our
time and place what Mateo Ricci was striving to do four centuries
ago in China.
I realize how strange, even outlandish, it seems to take Mateo
Ricci and the great Jesuit experiment in China as our model here.

1

This is not to say that we cannot claim in certain areas to have gained
certain insights and settled certain questions which still troubled our
ancestors. For instance, we are able to see the Inquisition clearly for the
unevangelical horror that it was. But this doesn't exclude our having lot
to learn from earlier ages as well, even from people who also made the
mistake of supporting the Inquisition.
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It seems impossible to take this kind of stance·towards our time;
and that for two opposite reasons. First, we are too close to it. This
is still, in many respects, a Christian civilization; at least, it is a
society with many churchgoers. How can we start from the
outsider's standpoint which was inevitably Ricci's?
But immediately we say this, we are reminded of all those facets
of modern thought and culture which strive to define Christian
faith as the other, as what needs to be overcome and set firmly in
the past, if Enlightenment, Liberalism, humanism is to flourish.
With this in mind, it's not hard to feel an outsider. But just for this
reason, the Ricci project can seem totally inappropriate. He faced
another civilization, one built largely in ignorance of the JudaeoChristian revelation; so the question could arise how to adapt this
latter to these new addressees. But to see modernity under its nonChristian aspect is generally to see it as anti-Christian, as deliberately excluding the Christian kerygma. And how.can you adapt
your message to its negation?
So the Ricci project in relation to our own time looks strange
for two seemingly incompatible reasons. On one hand, we feel
already at home here, in this civilization which has issued from
Christendom, so what do we need to strive further to understand?
On the other hand, whatever is foreign to Christianity seems to
involve a rejection of it, so how can we envisage accommodating?
Put in other terms, the Ricci project involves the difficult task of
making new discriminations: what in the culture represents a valid
human difference, and what is incompatible with Christian faith?
The celebrated debate about the Chinese rites turned on this issue.
But it seems that for modernity, things are already neatly sorted
out: whatever is in continuity with our past is legitimate Christian
culture, and the novel, secularist twist to things is simply incompatible. No further enquity seems necessary.
Now I think that this double reaction, which we are easily
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tempted to go along with, is quite wrong. The view I'd like to
defen'd, if I can put it in a nutshell, is that in modern, secularist
culture there are mingled together both authentic developments of
the Gospel, of an Incarnational mode of life, and also a closing off
to God which negates the Gospel. The notion is that modern
culture, in breaking with the structures and beliefs of Christendom,
also carried certain facets of Christian life further than they ever
were taken, or could have been taken within Christendom. In
relation to the earlier forms of Christian culture, we have to face
the humbling realization that the breakout was a necessary
condition of the development.
For instance, modern Liberal political culture is characterized
by an affirmation of universal human rights - to life, freedom,
citizenship, self-realization- which are seen as radically unconditional·. That is, they are not dependent on such things as gender,
cultural belonging, civilizational.development, or religious allegiance, which always limited them in the past. As long as we were
living within the terms of "Christendom," that is, of a civilization
where the structures, institutions and culture were all supposed to
reflect the Christian nature of the society (even in the nondenominational form in which this was understood in the early
USA), we could never have attained this radical unconditionality.
It is difficult for a "Christian" society, in this sense, to accept full
equality of rights for atheists, or people of a quite alien religion,
or those who violate what seems to be the· Christian moral code
(e.g., homosexuals).
This is not because having Christian faith as such makes you
narrow or intolerant, as many militant unbelievers say. We have
our share of bigots and zealots, to be sure, but we are far from
alone in this. The record of certain forms of militant atheism in this
century is far from reassuring. No, the impossibility I was arguing
for doesn't lie in Christian faith itself, but in the project of
Christendom: the attempt to marry the faith with a form of culture
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and a mode of society. There is something noble in the attempt;
indeed, it is inspired by the very logic of Incarnation I mentioned
above, whereby it strives to be interwoven more and more in
human life. But as a project to be realized in history, it is ultimately
doomed to frustration, even threatens to turn into its opposite.
That's because human society in history inevitably involves
coercion (as political society, at least, but also in other ways); it
involves the pressure of conformity; it involves inescapably some
confiscation of the highest ideals for narrow interests; and a host
of other imperfections. There can never be a total fusion of the faith
and any particular society; and the attempt to achieve it is
dangerous for the faith. Something of this kind has been recognized from the beginning of Christianity in the distinction between
Church and State. The various constructions of Christendom since
then could be seen unkindly as attempts post-Constantine to bring
Christianity closer to the other, prevalent forms of religion, where .
the sacred was bound up with and supported the political order.
A lot more can be said for the project of Christendom than this
unfavorable judgement allows. But nevertheless, this project at its
best sails very close to the wind, and is in constant danger of
turning into a parodic denial of itself.
Thus to say that the fulness of rights culture couldn't have come·
about under Christendom is not to point to a special weakness of
Christian faith. Indeed, the attempt to put some secular philosophy
in the place of the faith- Jacobinism, Marxism- has scarcely led
to better results (and in some cases, spectacularly worse). This
culture has flourished where the casing of Christendom has been
broken open, and where no other single. philosophy has taken its
place, but the public sphere has remained the locus of competing
ultimate visions.
I also make no assumption that modern rights culture is
perfectly all right as it is. On the contrary, it has lots of problems.
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I· hope to come to some of these later. But for all its drawbacks,
it has produced something quite remarkable: the attempt to call
political power to booK against a yardstick of fundamental human
requirements, universally applied. As the present Pope has amply
testified, it· is impossible for the Christian conscience not to be
moved by this.
This example illustrates the thesis I'm trying to argue here.
Somewhere along the line of the last centuries the Christian faith
was attacked from within Christendom and dethroned. In some
cases, gradually dethroned, without being frontally attacked
(largely in Protestant countries); but this displacement also often
meant sidelining, rendering the faith irrelevant to great segments
of modern life. In other cases, the confrontation was bitter, even
violent; the dethroning followed long and vigorous attack (e.g., in
France, in Spain, that is, largely in Catholic countries). In neither
case is the development particularly comforting for Christian faith.
And yet, we have to agree that it was this process which made
possible what we now recognize as a great advance in the practical
penetration of the Gospel in human life.
Where does this leave us? Well, it's a humbling experience. But
also a liberating one. The humbling side: we are reminded by our
more aggressive securlarist colleagues: "it's lucky that the show is
no longer being run by you. card-carrying Christians, or we'd be
back with the Inquisition:" The liberating side comes when we
recognize the truth in this (however exaggerated the formulation),
and draw the appropriate conclusions. This kind of freedom, so
much the fruit of the Gospel, we only have when nobody (that is,
no particular outlook) is running the show. So a vote of thanks to
Voltaire and others for (not necessarily wittingly) showing us this,
and allowing us to live the Gospel in a purer way, free of that
continual and often bloody forcing of conscience which was the
sin and blight of all those "Christian" centuries. The Gospel was
always meant to stand out, unencumbered by arms. We have now
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been able ~to returh a little 'closer to this ideal -with a little help
from our enemies.
Does acknowledging our debt mean that we have to fall silent?
Not at all. This freedom, which is prized by so many different
people for different reasons, also has its Christian meaning. It is,
for instance, the freedom to come to God on one's own; or
otherwise put, moved only by the Holy Spirit, whose barely
audible voice will often be heard better when the loudspeakers of
armed authority are silent.
That is true, but it may well be that Christians will feel reticent
about about articulating this meaning; lest they be· seen as trying
to take over again, by giving the (authoritative) meaning. But here
they may be doing a disservice to this freedom. And this for a
reason which they are far froin being alone in seeing, but which
they are often' more likely to discern than their secularist compatriots.
The very fact that freedom has been well-served·by a situation
in which no view is in charge, that it has therefore gained from the
relatively weakening of Christianity, and from the absence of any
other strong, transcendental outlook, can. seem to accredit the
view that human life is better off without transcendental vision
altogether. The development of modern freedom is then identified
with the rise of an exclusive humanism, that is, one based
exclusively on a notion of human flourishing, which recognizes no
valid aim beyond this. The strong sense which continually arises
that there is something more,·that human life aims beyond itself,
is stamped as an illusion; and judged to be a dangerous illusion,
since the peaceful coexistence of people in freedom has already
been identified as the fruit of waning transcendental visions.
To a Christian, this outlook seems 'stifling. Do we really have
to pay this price to enjoy modern freedom? A kind of spiritual
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lobotomy? Well, no-one can deny that religion generates dangerous passions. But-that is far from being the whole story. Exclusive
humanism also carries great dangers, which remain very underexplored in modern thought.

'

n
I want to look at two of these here. In doing so, I will be

offeri~g my own interpretation of modern life and sensibilities.

All this is very much open to contestation. But we urgently need
new perspectives in this domain, as it were, Ricci-readings of
modernity.
The first danger that threatens at:l exclusive humanism, which
wipes out the transcendent beyond life, is that it provoke as
reaction an immanent negation of life. Let me try to expla~n this
a little better.
I have been speaking of the transcendent as being "beyond
life." In doing this, I am trying to get at something which is not only
essential in Christianity, but in a number of other faiths, for
instance, in Buddhism. A fundamental idea enters these faiths in
very different form, but which one might try to grasp in the claim
that life isn't the whole story.
There is one way to take this expression, which is as meaning
something like: life goes on after death, there is a continuation, our
life doesn't totally end in our deaths. I don't mean to deny what
is affirmed on this readi"ng, but I want to take the expression here
in a somewhat different (though undoubtedly related) sense.
What I mean is something more like: the point of things isn't
exhausted by life, the fulness of life, even the goodness of life. This
is not meant to be just a repudiation of egoism, the idea that the
fulness of my life (and perhaps those of people I love) should be
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my concern. Let us agree with John Stuart Mill that a full life must
involve striving for the benefit of human kind. Then acknowledging the transcendent means seeing a point beyond that.
One form of this is the insight that we can find in suffering and
death not merely negation, the undoing:of fulness and life, but also
a place to affirm something which matters beyond life, on which
life itself originally draws. The last clause seems to bring us back
into the focus on life. It may be readily understandable even within
the purview of an exclusive humanism how one could accept
suffering and death in order to give life to others. On a certain view,
that too, has been part of the fulness of life. Acknowledging the
transcendent involves something more. What matters beyond life
doesn't matter just because it sustains life; otherwise it wouldn't be
"beyond life" in the meani"ng of the act. (For Christians, God wills
human flourishing, but "thy will be done" doesn't reduce to "let
human beings flourish.")
This is the way of putting it which goes most against the grain
of contemporary Western civilization. There are other ways of
framing it. One which goes back to the very beginning of
Christianity is a redefinition of the term "life" to incorporate what
I'm calling "beyond life": for instance, the NT evocations of
"eternal life," and John 10.10.
Or we could put it in a third way: acknowledging the
transcendent means being called to a change of identity. Buddhism gives us an obvious reason to talk this way. The change here
is quite radical, from self to "no-self' (anatta). But Christian faith
can be seen in the same terms: as calling for a radical decentring
of the self, in relation with God. ("Thy will be done.") In the
language of Abbe Henri Bremond in his magnificent study of
French 17th Century spiritualities, 2 we can speak of "theocentrism."
1
This way of putting it brings ?ut a similar point to my first way,
Henri Bremond, Histoire litteraire du sentiment religieux en France
depuis la fin des guerres de religion jusqu 'a nos jours, Paris: A. Colin,
2

1967-68.
16

since most conceptions of a flourishing life assume a stable
identity, the self for whom flourishing can be defined.
So acknowledging the transcendent means aiming beyond life,
or opening yourself to a change in identity. But if you. do this,
where do you stand to human flourishing? There is much division,
confusion, uncertainty about this. Historic religions have in fact
combined concern for flourishing and transcendence in their
normal practice. It has even been the rule that the supreme
achievements of those who went beyond life have served to
nourish the fulness of life of those who remain on this side of the
b.arrier. Thus prayers at the tombs of martyrs brought long life,
health and a whole host of good things for the Christian faithful;
and something of the same is true for the tombs of certain saints
in Muslim lands; while in Theravada Buddhism,, for example, the
dedication of monks is turned, through blessings, amulets, etc., to
all the ordinary purposes of flourishing among the laity.
·· Over against this, there have recurrently been "reformers" in all
religions who have considered this symbiotic, complementary
relation between renunciation and flourishing to be a travesty.
They insist on returning religion to its "purity," and posit the goals
of renunciation on their own, as goals for everyone, and disintricated
from the pursuit of flourishing. Some are even moved to denigrate
the latter pursuit altogether, to declare it unimportant, or an
obstacle to sanctity.
But this extreme stance runs athwart a very central thrust in
some religions. Christianity and Buddhism will be my examples
here. Re11ouncing, aiming beyond life, not only takes you away,
but also brings you back to flourishing. In Christian terms, if
renunciation decentres you in relation with God, God's will is that
humans flourish, and so you are taken back to an affirmation of
this flourishing, which is biblically called agape. In Buddhist terms,
Enlightenment doesn't just turn you from the world, but also opens
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the flood-gates of metta (loving kindness) and karuna (compas~
sian). There is the Theravada concept of the Paccekabuddha,
concerned only for his own salvation, but he is ranked below the
highest Buddha, who acts for the liberation of all beings.
Thus outside of the stance whic~ ~c~epts t~e coqtplementary
symbiosis of renunciation and flourishing, and beyond the stance
of purity, there is a third one, which I could call the stance of
agapcYkaruna.
Enough has been said to bring out the conflict between modert?culture and the transcendent. In fact, a powerful constitutive strand
.
'
of modern western spirituality is involved in an affirmation of life.
It is perhaps evident in tht; contemporary concern to preserve life,
to bring prosperity, to reduce suffering, world-wide, which is I
believe without precedent in history.
f

This arises historically out of wh~it I have called elsewhere3 "the
affirmation of ordinary life." What I was trying to gesture at with
this term is the cultural revolution of the early modern period,
which dethroned the supposedly higher activities of contemplation and the citizen life, and put the centre of gravity of goodness
in ordinary living, production and the family. It belongs to this
spiritual outlook that our first concern ought to be to increase life,
relieve suffering, foster prosperity. Corkern above all for the "good
life" smacked of pride! of self-absorption. And beyond'that, it was
inherently inegalitarian, since the alleged "higher" activities could
only be carried out by an elite minority, whereas leading rightly
one's ordinary life was open to everyone. This is a moral temper
to which it seems obvious that our major concern must be our
dealings with others, injustice and benevolence; and these dealings must be on a level of equality.

3See

Sources of the Self, Harvard University Press, 1989, chapter 13!
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This affirmation, which constitutes a major component of our
modern ethical outlook, ~as originally inspired by a mode. of
Christian piety. It exalted practical agape, and was polemically
directed against the pride, elitism, one might say, self-absorption
of those who believed in "higher" activities or spiritualities.
Consider the Reformers attack on the supposedly "higher"
vocations,of the
monastic life. These were meant to mark out elite
.
paths of superior dedication, but were in fact deviations into pride
and self-delusion. The really holy life for the Christian
was
within
,l
t
ordinary life itself, living in
in a Christian and
. .work and household
...
worshipful
manner.
..
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· There was an earthly, one might say, earthy critique of the
allegedly "higher" here which was then transposed, and used as
a secular critique of Christianity, and indeed, religion·in general.
Something of the same rhetorical stanc~ adopted by Reformers
>
•
I
against monks and nuhs is taken up by secularists and unbelievers
aga'inst Christian faith itself: This allegedly scorns the real, sensual,
eaithly human good for some purely imiginacy higher end, the
pursuit ofwhich 1 ~an only lead to the frustration of the real, earthly'
good, to suffering, mortification, repression, etc. The motivations
of those who espouse this "higher'' path are thus, indeed, suspect.
Pride, elitism, the desire to dominate play a part in this story too,
along with fear and timidity (also present in the earlier Reformers'
story, but less prominent) .
k

.

.

In'" this ·critique, of course; religion 'is identified with the
second,' purist stance above; or else with a combination of this and
the first '~symbiotic" (usually labelled "superstitious") stance. The·
t}:lird, ·the stance of agape/karuna, becomes· invisible. That is
because a transformed variant of it has in fact been assumed by the
secularist citic.
Now one musn't exaggerate. This outlook on religion is far
from being universal in our society. One might think that· this is
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particularly true in the US, witli the high rates ·here of religious
belief ahd practice. And yet, I want to claim that this whole way
of understanding things has penetrated far deeper and wider than
simply card-carrying: village-atheist style ·secularists, that it also
shapes the outlook of many peop~ who see themselves
as believers.
*"'

~

..

What do I mean by "this way of.understanding?" Well, it is'a
climate . of thought/ a horizon .of assu1nptions, more than a
doctrine. That means that there will be some oistort'i~n in the1
attempt to lay it out in a set of propositions. But I'm going t~ do
that anyway, because there is no other way of characterizing it that
I know.
L

If it w~re .spelled out in propositions, it would read something
like this: (a) that for us life, flourishing, driving back the frontiers
of death and ~~ffering 'are of supreme value; (b) that this w~~_n't
always so; it wasn't so for our ancestors, and for people in other.
' earlier civilizations; (c) that one of things whi~.;h s.t<:>pped it being
so in the past was precisely a sense, inculcated by religion, that
there were "higher" goals; (d) that we have arrived at (a) by a
critique and overcoming of (this kind of) religion.
I.

.

.

.

We live in something analogous to a post-revolutionary eli•
mate. Revolutions generate the sense tha~ they have won a great
victory, and identify the adversary in the previous regime. A postrevolutionary climate is one which. is extremely .sensitive to
anything which smacks of the ancien regime, and sees backsliding
even in '"relatively innocent concessions to generalized human
preferences. Thus Puritans who saw the return of Popery in any
rituals, or Bolsheviks· who compulsively addressed people as
"Comrade," proscribing the ordinary appellation "Mister."
I would argue that a milder, but very pervasive version of this
kind of climate is widespread in our culture. To speak of aiming
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beyond life is to appear to undermine the supreme concern with
life of our humanitarian, "civilized" world. It is to try to reverse the
revolution, and bring back the bad old order of priorities, in which
life and happiness could be sacrificed on the altars of renunciation.
Hence even believers are often induced to redefine their faith in
such a 'way as nofto challenge the primacy o_f life.
My claim is that this climate, often unaccompanied by any
formulated /~wareness of the underlying reasons, pervades our
C';Ilture. It emerges, for instance, in the wi~espread inability to give
any human meaning to suffering and death, other than as dangers
and enemies to be avoided or combatted. This inability is not just
the failing of certain individuals; it is entrenched in many of our
institutions and practices, for instance the practice of medicine,
which has great trouble understanding its o~n limits, or c~nceiv
ing some natural term to human.life. 4
What gets lost, as always, in this post-revolutionary climate is
the crucial nuance. Challenging the primacy can mean two things.
It can mean trying to displace the saving of life and the avoidance
of suffering 'from their rank as central concerns of policy. Or it can
' making the
. claim, or at least opening the way for the
also mean
insight, tli.at more than life matters: These
are evidently not the
same. It is,not even true, as people might plausibly believe, that
they are causally 'linked, in the sense that making the second
challenge "'softens us up," and rriakes the first challenge ea~ier.
Indeed, I want to claim (and did•in the ·concluding c,hapter of
Sources) that the reverse is the case: that clinging to the primacy
of life in the second (let's call this the "metaphysical") sense is
m'kK:ing it harder for us to affirm it wholeheartedly in the first (or
•
•
.
(4
"
•
..
,
practical sense).
·

tWo

4

Cf. Daniel Callahan, Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging
Society, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1995.
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But I don't want to pursue this claim right now. I return to it
below. The tliesis I'rri presenting here is that"it is in vlrtue of its
"post-revolutionary climate" that western modernity is very inhos::
pitable to the transcendent. This, of course, runs contrary to the
mainline Enlightenment story, accordi!.:g to whiCh religion has
become less credible thanks to the advance ofscience. There is,
of course, something in this, but it isn't in my ~riew the main story.
More, to the extent that it is true, that is, that people interpret
science' and religion as ·at loggerheads,. it is often because of ari
already felt incompatibility at the moral level. It is this deeper level
1
that I have been trying to e:cplore here.
t.

In other wo"rds: to oversimplif{again, the obstaclJs to belief in
Western modernity are prima.riiy moral and spiritual, rather than
epistemic. I am·falking~about the driving force here, rather than
what is said in justification of unbelief in arguments:

m
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But I ar11 in danger of wandering from the mail? line of my
argument. I have be~n painting a portrait of ~ur age in order to be
able to suggest that.exclusive humanism has provoked, as i~ were,
a revolt from within. But before I do this, let us pause.to notice how
in the secularist affir~ation of ordiri'ary life, just as with the positing
of universal and unconditional
rights, an undeniable
.
. p~olongation.
of the Gospel has been perplexingly linked with a denial of
I
transcendence.
~

J
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We live in an extraordinary moral culture, measured against the
norm of human history, in which suffering and ,death, through
famine, flood, earthquake, pestilence or war, can awaken worldwide movements of sympathy and practical solidarity. Granted, of
course, that this is made possible by modern media and modes of
transportation, not to speak o(surpluses. These shouldn't blind us
'

•

'
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to the importance of the cultural-moral change. The same media
and means of transport don't awaken the same response everywhere; it is disproportionately strong in ex-Latin Christendom.
Let us grant also the distortions produced by media hype and
the media-gazer's short attention span, the way dramatic pictures
produce the strongest response, often relegating even more needy
cases to a zone of neglect from which only the cameras of CNN can
rescue them. Nevertheless, the phenomenon is remarkable, and
for the Christian conscience inspiring. The age of Hiroshima and
Auschwitz has also produced Amnesty International and Medecins
sarls Frontieres.
The Christian roots of all this run deep. First, there is the
extraordinary missionary effort of the Counter-reformation Church,
taken up later by the Protestant denominations. Then there were
the mass-mobilization campaigns of the early nineteenth Century-the anti-slavery movement in England, largely inspired and
led by Evangelicals; the parallel abolitionist movement in this
country, also largely Christian inspired. Then this habit of mobilizing for the redress of injustice and the relief of suffering worldwide becomes part of our political culture. Somewhere along the
road, this culture ceases to be simply Christian-inspired although·'people of deep Christian faith continue to be important
in today's movements. Moreover, it needed this breach with the
culture of Christendom, as I 'argued above in connection with
human rights, for the impulse of solidarity to transcend the frontier
of Christendom itself.
So we see a phenomenon, of which the Christian conscience
cannot but say "flesh of my flesh, and bone of my bone;" and which
is paradoxically often seen by some of its most dedicated carriers
as conditional on a denial of the transcendent. We return again to
the point our argument was at some time ago, in which the
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Christian conscience experiences a mixture of humility and
unease. The humility in realizing that the break with Christendom
was necessary for this great extension of Gospel-inspired action;
the unease in the sense that the denial of transcendence places this
action under threat.
Which bring us back to the main line of the argument. One such
threat is what I am calling the immanent revolt. Of course this is
not something that can be demonstrated beyond doubt to those
who don't see it. And yet, from another perspective, it is just
terribly obvious. I am going to offer a perspectival reading; and in
the end we have to ask ourselves which perspective makes the
most sense of human life.
Exclusive humanism closes the transcendent window, as
though there were nothing beyond. More, as though it weren't a
crying need of the human heart to open that window, and first
gaze, then go beyond. As though feeling this need were the result
of a mistake, an erroneous world-view, bad conditioning, or
worse, some pathology. Two radically different. perspectives on
the human condition. Who is right?
Well, who can make more sense of the life all of us are living?
If we are right, then human beings have an ineradicable bent to
respond to something beyond life. Denying this stifles. But then,
even for those who accept the metaphysical primacy of life, this
outlook will itself seem imprisoning.
Now there is a feature of modern culture which fits this
perspective. This is the revolt from within unbelief, as it were,
against the primacy of life. Not now in the name of something
beyond, but really more just from a sense of being confined,
diminished by the acknowledgment of this primacy. This has been
an important stream in our culture, something woven into the
inspiration of poets, and writers; for example, Baudelaire (but was
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he entirely an unbeliever?) and Mallarme. But the most influential
proponent of this_kind of view is undoubtedly Nietzsche. And it
is significant that the most important anti-humanist thinkers of our
time:· e.g., Foucault, Derrida, behind them, Bataille, all draw
heavily on Nietzsche.
Nietzsche, of course, rebelled against the idea' that our highest
goal is to preserve and increase life, fo prevent suffering. He rejects
this both metaphysically and practically. He rejects the egalitarianism underlying this whole affirmation of ordinary life. But his
rebellion is in a sense also internal. Life itself can push to cruelty,
to domination, to exclusion, and indeed does so in its moments of
most exuberant affirmation.
So this move remains within the modern affirmation of life in
a sense. There is nothing higher than the movement of life itself
(the Will to Power). But it chafes at the benevolence, the
universalism, the harmony, the order. It wants to rehabilitate
destruction and chaos, the infliction of suffering and exploitation,
as part of the life to be affirmed. Life properly understood also
affirms death and destruction. To pretend otherwise is to try to
restrict it, tame it, hem it in, deprive it of its highest manifestatipns,
what makes it something you can say "yes" to.
A religion of life which would proscribe death-dealing, the
infliction of suffering, is confining and demeaning. Nietzsche
thinks of himself as having taken up some of the legacy of prePlatonic and pre-Christian warrior ethics, their exaltation of
courage, greatness, elite excellence. Modern life-affirming humanism breeds pusillanimity. This accusation frequently recurs in the
culture of counter-Enlightenment.
Of course, one of the fruits of this counter-culture was Fascism
- to which Nietzsche's influence was not entirely foreign,
however true and valid is Walter Kaufman's refutation of the
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simple myth of Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi. But in spite of this, the
fascination with death and violence recurs, e.g., in the' interest in
Bataille, shared by Derrida and Foucault. James Miller's book on
Foucault shows the depths of this rebellion against ''humanism,"
as a stifling, confining space one hast~ break out of.S
..
My·point here is not to score off neo-~ietzscheanism, as some
kind of antechamber to Fascism. A secular humanist might want
to do this. But my perspective is rather different. I se~ these
connections as another manifestation of our (human) inability to
be content simply with ·an affirmation of life.
The Nietzschean understanding of enhanced life, which cari
fully affirm itself, also in a sense takes us beyond life; and in this
it is analogous with other, religious notions of enhanced life (like
the NT's "eternal life"). But it takes us beyond by incorporating a
fascination with the negation of life, with death and suffering. It
doesn't acknowledge some supreme good beyond life, and in that
sense sees itself rightly as utterly antithetical to religion.
-1 am tempted to speculate further, and to suggest that the

perennial human susceptibility to be fascinated by death and
violence, is at base a manifestation of our nature as homo
religiosus. From the point of view of someone who acknowledges
transcendence, it is one of the places this aspiration beyond most
easily goes when it fails to take us there. This doesn't mean that
religion and violence are simply alternatives. On the contrary, it
has meant that most historical religion has been deeply ini:ricated
with violence, from human sacrifice down to inter-communal
massacres. Because most historical religion remains only very
imperfectly oriented to the beyond. The religious affinities of the
cult of violence in its different forms are indeed palpable.

5James

Miller, Tbe Passion of Michel Foucault, New York: Simon &

Schuster, 1993.
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What it might mean, however, is that the only way fully to
escape the draw towards violence lies somewhere in the turn to
transcendence, that is, through the full-hearted love of some
good beyond life. A thesis of this kind has been put forward by
Rene Girard, for whose work I have a great deal of sympathy,
although I don't agree on the centrality he gives to the scapegoat
plienomenon. 6
On the perspective I'm developing here, no position can be set
aside as simply devoid of insight. We could think of modern
culture as the scene of a three~cornered- perhaps ultimately, a
four-cornered - battle. There are secular humanists, there are
neo-Nietzscheans, and there are those who acknowledge some
good beyond life. Any pair can gang up against the third on some
important issue. Neo-Nietzscheans and secular humanists together
condemn religion and reject any good beyond life. But neoNietzscheans and acknowledgers of transcendence are together in
their absence of surprise at the continued disappointments of
secular humanism, together also in the sense that its vision of life
lacks a dimension. In a third line-up, secular humanists and
believers come together in defending an idea of the human good,
against the anti-humanism of Nietzsche's heirs.
A fourth party can be introduced to this field if we take account
of the fact that the acknowledgers of transcendence are divided.
Some think that the whole move to secular humanism was just a
mistake, which needs to be undone. We need to return to an earlier
view of things. Others, in which I place myself, think that the
practical primacy of life has been a great gain for human kind, and
that there is some truth in the "revolutionary" story: this gain was
in fact unlikely to come about without some breach with estab-

6

See Rene Girard, La Violence et le Sacre; Paris: Grasset, 1972; and Le
Bouc Emissaire, Paris: Grasset, 1982
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lished religion. (We might even be tempted to say that modern
unbelief is providential, but that might be too provocative a way
of putting it.) But we nevertheless think that the metaphysical
primacy of life is wrong, and stifling, and that its continued
dominance puts in danger the practical primacy.
I have rather complicated the scene in the last paragraphs.
Nevertheless, the simple lines sketched earlier still stand out, I
believe. Both secular humanists and anti-humanists concur in the
"revolutionary" story; that is, they see us as having been liberated
from the illusion of a good beyond life, and thus enabled to affirm
ourselves. This may take the form of an Enlightenment endorsement of benevolence and justice; or it may be the charter for the
full affirmation of the will to power - or "the free play of the
signifier," or the aesthetics of the self, or whatever the current
version is. But it remains within the same post-revolutionary
climate. For those fully within this climate, transcendence becomes all but invisible.
IV

The above picture of modern culture, seen from one perspective, suggests a way in which the denial of transcendence can put
the most valuable gains of modernity in danger, here the primacy
of rights and the affirmation of life. This is, I repeat, one
perspective among others; the issue is whether it makes more
sense of what has been happening over the last two centuries than
that of an exclusive, secular humanism. It seems very much to me
that it does so.
I want now to take up this danger from another angle. I spoke
above about an immanent revolt against the affirmation of life.
Nietzsche has become an important figure in the articulation of
this, a counter-belief to the modern philanthropy which strives to
increase life and relieve suffering. But Nietzsche also articulated
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something equally disquieting: an acid account of the sources of
this modern philanthropy,. of the mainsprings of this compassion
and sympathy which powers the impressive enterprises of
modern solidarity.
Nietzsche's "genealogy" of modern universalism, of the concern for the relief of suffering, of "pity," will probably not convince
anyone who has the highest examples of Christian agape, or
Buddhist karuna, before their eyes. But the question remains very
much open, whether this unflattering portrait doesn't capture the
possible fate of a culture which has aimed higher than its moral
sources can sustain it.
This is the issue I raised very qriefly in the last chapter of
Sources. The more impressed one is with this colossal extension
of a Gospel ethic to a universal solidarity, to a concern for human
beings on the other side of the globe, whom we shall never meet
or need as companions or compatriots; or, because that is not the
ultimately difficult challenge, the more impressed we are at the
sense of justice we can still feel for people we do have contact with,
and tend to dislike or despise; or at a willingness to help people
who often seem to be the cause of their own suffering; the more
we contemplate all this, the more surprise we can feel at people
generating the motivation to engage in these enterprises of
solidarity, of international philanthropy, or the modern welfare,
state. Or to bring out the negative side, the less surprised one is
when the motivation to keep them going flags, as we see in the
present hardening of feeling against the impoverished and
disfavoured in many Western democracies.
We could put the matter this way. Our age makes higher
demands of solidarity and benevolence on people today than ever
before. Never before have people been asked to stretch out so far,
and so consistently, so systematically, so as a matter of course, to
the stranger outside the gates. A similar point can be made, if we
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look at the other dimension of the affirmation of ordinary life, that
concerned with universal justice.' Here too, we are asked to
maintain standards of equality which cover wider and wider
classes of people, bridge more and more kinds of difference,
impinge more and more in our lives. H~w do we manage to do it?
,

Or perhaps we don't manage all that well; and the interesting
and important question might run: how could we manage to do
it? But at least to get close to the answer to this, we should ask:
how do we do as well as we do, which after all, at first sight seems
in these domains of solidarity and justice much better than
previous ages?
1. Well, one way is that performance to these standards has
become part of what we understand as a decent, civilized human
life. We live up to them to the extent we do, because we would
be somewhat ashamed of ourselves if we didn't. They have
become part of our self-image, our sense of our own worth. And
alongside this, we feel a sense of satisfaction and superiority when
we contemplate others- our ancestors, or contemporary illiberal
societies - who dian't or don't recognize them.
But we sense immediately how fragile this is as a motivation.
It makes our philanthropy vulnerable to the shifting fashion of
media attention, and the various modes of feel-good hype. We
throw ourselves into the cause of the month, raise funds for this
famine, petition the government to intervene in that grisly civil
war; and then forget all about it next month, when it drops off the
CNN screen. A solidarity ultimately driven by the giver's own sense
of moral superiority is a whimsical and fickle thing. We are far in
fact from the universality and unconditionality which our moral
outlook prescribes.
We might envisage getting beyond this by a more exigent sense
of our own moral wo'rth; one that would require more consistency,
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a certain independence from fashion, careful, informed attention
to the real needs. This is part of what people working in NGOs in
the field must feel, who correspondingly look down on us TVimage-driven givers, as we do on the lesser breeds who don't
respond to this type of campaign at all.
2. But the most exigent, lofty sense of self-worth has limitations. I feel worthy in helping people, in giving without stint. But
~hat is worthy about helping people? It's obvious, as humans they
have a certain dignity. My feelings of self-worth connect intellectually and emotionally with my sense of the worth of human
beings. Here is where modern secuiar humanism is tempted to
congratulate itself. In replacing the low and demeaning picture of
human beings as depraved, inveterate sinners, in articulating the
potential of human beings for goodness and greatness, humanism
has not only given us the courage to act for reform, but also
explains why this philanthropic action is so immensely worthwhile. The higher the human potential, the greater the enterprise
of realizing it, the more the carriers of this potential are worthy of
our help in achieving it.
But philanthropy and solidarity driven by a lofty humanism,
just as that which was driven often by high religious ideals, has a
Janus face. On one side, in the abstract, one is inspired to act. But
on the other, faced with the immense disappointments of actual
human performance, with the myriad ways in which real, concrete.
human beings fall short of, ignore, parody and betray this
magnificent potential, one cannot but experience a growing sense
of anger and futility. Are these people really worthy objects of all
these efforts? Perhaps in face of all this stupid recalcitrance, it
would not be a betrayal of human worth, or one's self-worth, if one
abandoned them. Or perhaps the best that can be done for them
is to force them to shape up.
I

Before the reality of human shortcomings, philanthropy- the
love of the human - can gradually come to be invested with

31

contempt, hatred, aggression. The action is broken off, or worse,
continues, but invested now with these new feelings, and becomes
progressively more coercive and inhumane. The.history of despotic socialism, i.e., twentieth century communism, is replete with
this tragic turn, brilliantly forseen by Dq~toyevsky over 100 years
ago ("Starting from unlimited freedom, I arrived at un!imited ,
despotism" 7), and then repeated again and again with a fatal
regularity, through one-party regimes on a macro level, to a host
of "helping" institutions on a micro level from orphanages to
boarding schools for aboriginals.
The ultimate stop on the line was reached by Elena Ceaucescu
in her last recorded statement before her murder by the successor
regime: that the Rumanian people have shown themselves unworthy of the immense untiring efforts of her husband on their behalf.
The tragic irony is that the higher the sense of potential, the
more grievously real people fall short, and the more severe the
turn-around will be which is inspired by the disappointment. A
lofty humanism posits high standards of self-worth, and a magnificent goal to strive towards. It inspires enterprises of great moment.
But by this very token it encourages force, despotism, tutelage,
ultimately contempt, and a certain ruthlessness is shaping refractory human material. Oddly enough, the same horrors which
Enlightenment critique picked up in societies and institutions
dominated by religion.
And for the same causes. The difference of belief here is not
crucial. Wherever action for high ideals is not tempered, controlled, uitimately engulfed in an unconditional love of the
beneficiaries, this ugly dialectic risks repeating !tself. And of
course, just holding the appropriate religious beliefs is no guarantee that this will be so. ·
Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Devils, Trans. David Magarshack,
Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971, p. 404.
7
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3. A third pattern of motivation, which we have seen repeatedly, this time in the register of justice rather than benevolence: We
have seen it with Jacobins, Bolsheviks, and today with the
politically correct left, as well as the so-called "Christian" right. We
fight against injustices which cry out to heaven for vengeance. We
are moved by flaming indignation against these: racism, oppression, sexism, or leftist attacks on the family or Christian faith. This
indignation comes to be fuelled by hatred for those who support
and connive with these injustices; and this in turn is fed by our
sense of superiority that we are not like these instruments and
accomplices of evil. Soon we are blinded to the havoc we wreak
around us. Our picture of the world has safely located all evil
outside of us. The very energy and hatred with which we combat
evil proves its exteriority to us. We must never relent, but on the
contrary double our energy, vie with each other in indignation
and denunciation.

a

Another tragic irony nests here. The stronger the sense of (often
correctly identified) injustice, the more powerfully this pattern can
become entrenched. We become centres of hatred, generators of
new modes of injustice on a greater scale, but we started with the
most exquisite sense of wrong, the greatest passion for justice and
equality and peace.
A Buddh_ist friend of mine from Thailand briefly visited the
German Greens. He confessed to utter bewilderment. He thought
he understood the goals of the party: peace between human
beings, and a stance of respect and friendship by humans towards
nature. But what astonished him was all the anger, the tone of
denunciation, of hatred towards the established parties. These
people didn't seem to see that the first step towards their goal
would have to involve stilling the anger and aggression in
themselves. He couldn't understand what they were up to.
The blindness is typical of modern exclusive secular human-
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ism. This modern humanism prides itself on having released
energy for philanthropy and reform; by getting rid of"original sin,"
of a lowly and demeaning picture of human nature, it encourages
us to reach high. Of course, there is some truth in this. But it is also,
terribly partial, terribly naive, because it has never faced the
questions I have been raising here: what can power this gr~at effort
at philanthropic reform? This humanism leaves us with our own
high sense of self-worth to keep us from backsliding, a high notion
of human worth to inspire us forward, and a flaming indignation
against wrong and oppression to energize us. It cannot appreciate
how problematic all of these are, how easily they can slide into
something trivial, ugly or downright dangerous and destructive.
A Nietzschean genealogist can have a field day here. Nothing
gave Nietzsche greater satisfaction than showing how morality or
spirituality is really powered by its direct opposite; e.g., that the
Christian aspiration to love is really motivated by the hatred of the
weak for the strong. Whatever one thinks of this judgement on
Christianity, it is clear that modern humanism is full of potential for
such disconcerting reversals: from dedication to others to selfindulgent, feel-good responses, from a lofty sense of human
dignity to control powered by contempt and hatred, from absolute
freedom to absolute despotism, from a flaming desire to help the
oppressed to an incandescent hatred for all those who stand in the
way. And the higher,the flight, the greater the potential fall.
Perhaps after all, it's safer to have small goals, not too great
expectations, be somewhat cynical about human potentiality from
the start. This is undoubtedly so, but then one also risks not having
the motivation to undertake great acts of solidarity, and combat
great injustices. In the end, the question becomes a maximum one:
how to have the greatest degree of philanthropic action with the
minimum hope in mankind. A figure like Or. Rieu in Camus' La
Peste stands as a possible solution to this problem. But that is
fiction. What is possible in real life?
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I said earlier that just having appropriate beliefs is no solution
to these dile"mmas. And the transformation of high ideals into
brutal practice was demonstrated lavishly in Christendom well
before modern humanism came on the scene. So is there a
way out?
This cannot be a matter of guarantee, only of faith. But it is clear
that Christian spirituality points to one. It can be described in two
ways. Either as a love/compassion which is unconditional, that is,
not based on what you the recipient have made of yourself; or as
one based on what you are most profoundly, a being in the image
of God. They obviously amount to the same thing. In either case,
the love is not conditional on the worth realized in you just as an
individual, or even in what is realizable in you alone. That's
because being made in the image of God, as a feature of each
human being, is not something that can be characterized just by
reference to this being alone. Our being in the image of God is also
our standing among others in the stream of love which is that facet
of God's life we try to grasp, very inadequately, in speaking of
the Trinity.
Now it makes a whole lot of difference whether you think this
kind of love is a possibility for us humans. I think it is, but only to
the extent that we open ourselves to God, which means in fact,
overstepping the limits set in theory by exclusive humanisms. If
one does believe that, then one has something very important to
say to modern times, something that addresses the fragility of what
all of us, believer and unbeliever alike, most value in these times.
Can we try to take stock of the first leg of our strange Ricci-like
journey into the present? The trip is obviously not complete. We
have just looked at some facets of modernity: the espousal of
universal and unconditional rights, the affirmation of life, universal
justice and benevolence. Important as these are, there are plainly
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others: for instance, freedom; and also the ethic of authenticity, 8
to mention just two. Nor have I had time to examine other.dark
features of modernity, such as ·its drive towards instrumental
reason and control. But I think an examination of these other facets
would show a similar pattern. So I'd like to try to define this
more closely.
In a sense our journey was a flop. Imitating Ricci would involve
taking a distance from our time, feeling as strange in it as he was
arriving in China. But what we saw as children of Christendom was
first, something terribly familiar - certain intimations of the
Gospel, carried to unprecedented lenghts; and secondly, a flat
negation of our faith - exclusive humanism. But still, like Ricci,
we were bewildered by this. We had to struggle to make a
discernment, as he did. He wanted to distinguish between those
things in the new culture which came from the natural knowledge
we all have of God, and should be affirmed and extended, on one
hand; and those practices which were distortions and would have
to be changed on the other. And similarly, we are challenged to
a difficult discernment, trying to see what in modern culture
reflects its furthering of the Gospel, and what its refusal of
the transcendent.
The point of my Ricci image is that this is not easy. And the best
way to try to achieve it is to take at least some relative distance,
in history if not in geography. The danger is that we not be
sufficiently bewildered, that we think we have it all figured out
from the start, and we know what to affirm and .what to deny. We
then can enter smoothly into the mainstream of a debate which is
already going on in our society, about the nature and value of

SWhich I have discussed in Tbe Malaise ofModernity, Toronto: Anansi

1991; American edition: Tbe Ethics of Authenticity, Harvard University
Press, 1992.
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modernity. As I have indicated, 9 this debate tends to become
polarized between "boosters" and "knockers," who either condemn or affirm modernity en bloc, thus missing what is really at
stake here, which is how to rescue admirable ideals from sliding
into demeaning modes of realization.
From the Christian point of view, the corresponding error is to
fall into one. of two untenable positions: either we piCk certain
fruits of moden1ity, like human rights, and take them on board, but
then condemn the whole movement of thought and pr~ctice
which underly them, in particular the break-out from Christendom
(in earlier variants, even the fruits were condemned); or in reaction
to. this first position, we feel we have to go all the way with
the "boosters" of modernity, and become fellow travellers of
exclusive humanism.
Better, I would argue, after an initial (and let's face it, still
continuing) bewilderment, gradually to find our voice from within
the achievements of modernity; to measure the humbling degree
to which some of the most impressive extensions of a Gospel ethic
depended on a breakaway from Christendom; and from within
these gains try to make clear to ourselves and others the tremendous dangers that arise in them. It is perhaps not an accident that
the history of the twentieth century can be read either in a
perspective of progress, or in one of mounting horror. Perhaps it
is not contingent that it is the century both of Auschwitz and
Hiroshima, and of Amnesty International and Medecins sans
Frontieres. As with Ricci, the Gospel message to this time and
society has to respond both to what in it already reflects the life
of God, and to the doors which have been closed against this life.
And in the end, it is no easier for us than it was for Ricci to discern
both correctly, even if for opposite reasons. Between us twentiethcentury Catholics, we have our own variants of the Chinese Rites
controversy. Let us pray that we do better this time.
9

See op. cit.
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THE MARIANIST AWARD
Each year the University of Dayton presents the Marianist Award
to a Roman Catholic distinguished for achievement in scholarship
and the intellectual life.
Established in 1950, the award was originally presented to
individuals who made outstanding contributions to Mariology: In
1967, the concept for the award was broadened to honor those
people who had made outstanding contributions to humanity. The
award, as currently given, was reactivated in 1986.
The Marianist Award is named for the founding religious order
of the University of Dayton, the Society of Mary (Marianists). The
award ca;ries with it a stipend of $5,000.
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RECIPIENTS OF
THE MARIANIST AWARD
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
<~l<J~

1961
1963
1964
1965
1967
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
·1993
1994
1995
199d'·

Juniper Carol, O.F.M.
Daniel A. Lord, S.J.
Patrick Peyton, C.S.C.
Roger Brien
Emil Neubert, S.M.
Joseph A. Skelly, C.M.
Frank Duff
John McShain
Eugene F. Kennedy, Jr.
Winifred A. Feely
Bishop John F. Noll
Eamon R. Carroll, 0. Carm.
Coley Taylor'< ~
Rene Laurentin
Philip C. Hoelle, S.M.
Cyril 0. Vollert, S.J.
Eduardo Frei-Montalva
John Tracy Ellis
Rosemary Haughton
Timothy O'Meara
Walter]. Ong, S.J.
Sidney Callahan
John T. Noonan, Jr.
L<?uis Dupre
Monika ·Hellwig
Philip Gleason
J. Bryan Hehir·
Charles Taylor
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